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Abstract  
The Demsetz hypothesis states that secure claims to property arise when the value of creating 
those rights is sufficiently high. This paper examines the conditions under which this holds in 
an anarchy equilibrium in which players may allocate labor to production, to conflict, or to 
the public good of secure claims to property protection. In a simultaneous choice Nash 
equilibrium, no secure claims to property are created. However, if players play a sequential 
choice game in which secure claims to property protection occurs in the first stage, then the 
strategic benefit of reducing others’ subsequent conflict allocation causes secure claims to 
property to arise. Secure claims to property in a social contract are imperfect, but for 
sufficiently high productivity of resources, the social contract welfare dominates autocracy.
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1 Introduction 
It has long been recognized that property rights are an essential ingredient to a well-
functioning economy. What is less well understood, however, is how secure claims to 
property arise, especially when no state exists to provide them. Demsetz (1967) 
observed that the Montagnais bands in Quebec created secure claims to property for 
beaver ponds once fur trade with Europeans made the rent dissipation from an open 
access property rights regime sufficiently costly. He hypothesized that exogenous 
increases in the value of a resource leads to the establishment of secure claims to 
property for that resource. Important contributions to the evidence for the Demsetz 
hypothesis include Anderson and Hill (1975), who observed that grazing rights evolved 
informally in the American west, Umbeck (1977), who observed that miners in the 
California gold rush devised and enforced their own rules for protecting their mining 
claims, and Ostrom (1990), who discusses examples in which secure claims to property 
arose organically in Swiss alpine meadows, Spanish irrigation canals, and Japanese 
forests. 
The Demsetz hypothesis, however, is not without criticism. First it requires that agents 
somehow overcome the collective action problem of creating secure claims to property, 
but how this is accomplished is not clearly spelled out (Banner 2002). Second, secure 
claims to property have often arisen through collective actions that are at odds to the 
interests of many of the parties using the resource. Examples of this include the 
enclosure of European fields (Banner 2002), the Homestead Act in the U.S. (Anderson 
and Hill 1975), and property rights created in fisheries in Turkey and Nova Scotia, 
Canada (Ostrom 1990, at pp. 144–146, 174–178), where many of those who had 
formerly used the resource were subsequently excluded and were not compensated for 
their loss. Third, in many of the examples in which secure claims to property arose 
through collective action a significant amount of conflict also existed. This was true in 
the grazing association examples (Anderson and Hill 1975) and in the Californian 
mining camps (Clay and Wright 2005). In each case, this seems to have been 
exacerbated by the influx of large numbers of potential competitors. Thus it is also 
possible that an increase in the value, or productivity, of a resource may result in an 
increase in conflict, over the use of the resource, rather than the establishment of well-
defined property rights. 
This paper addresses each of these three issues. We examine a model in which agents 
have an endowment that can be used either for production or expropriation. Like Hafer 
(2006), we have two productive uses, subsistence consumption, which is secure, and 
production, which may be insecure. In the absence of secure claims to property, there 
exists an anarchy equilibrium (e.g., Skaperdas 1992; Hirshleifer 1995; Grossman and 
Kim 1995).1 To implement the conditions of the Demsetz hypothesis, we vary a 
parameter which measures the productivity of the endowment devoted to insecure 
production relative to subsistence consumption. As resources devoted to insecure 
production become more valuable, we determine what conditions must hold in order 
that the collective action problem of creating secure claims to property is overcome. Not 
surprisingly, we find that it is difficult for secure claims to property to arise organically as 
the solution to a collective action problem. First, for low values of the marginal product 
of insecure production, players will simply revert to subsistence consumption, as in 
Murphy et al. (1993). Even when the marginal productivity of insecure production is 
high, however, when players simultaneously allocate their endowment between 
subsistence consumption, insecure production, conflict, and a contribution to the public 
good of property protection, the symmetric Nash equilibrium results in zero contribution 
to the public good of ensuring claims to production secure. This occurs because 
investing in conflict dominates contributing to the public good of enforcing secure claims 
to property. Allocations to conflict increase the proportion of the total production a player 
appropriates, while devoting resources to ensuring all claims to property are secure only 
increases the proportion of his own production he appropriates; it reduces the 
proportion of others’ production he expropriates. Thus, in the simultaneous Nash 
equilibrium, claims to property remain insecure. Furthermore, this result is independent 
of the marginal productivity of resources used in insecure production. 
 
There are, however, two ways in which positive social provision to secure claims to 
property might arise in a non-cooperative game environment, and both require a version 
of the Demsetz hypothesis to hold. In the first, one player—the autocrat— offers his 
potential “citizens” protection of their property in exchange for his right to tax them. 
Since players may avoid insecure claims to property by allocating their endowment to 
subsistence consumption, which is not subject to theft, if the marginal productivity of 
insecure production is too low, even autocracy cannot arise. But when the marginal 
product of the insecure production is sufficiently high, an autocrat can offer his citizens a 
contract that they will accept. Thus, a nascent state may arise when the value of 
creating secure claims to property exceeds its social costs. 
 
A more organic form of the Demsetz hypothesis is also possible. In what we call a social 
contract, players play a two-stage game. In the first stage, players allocate part of their 
endowment to the public good of enforcing secure claims to property. Then, having 
observed the contributions by all players to the public good property protection, in the 
second stage players allocate the remainder of their endowment between subsistence 
consumption, conflict and a potentially insecure production. In the symmetric, sub-game 
perfect Nash equilibrium to this game, it is possible that players willingly contribute to 
the public good of property rights protection. Each player does so because he 
recognizes that an increase in his own contribution to secure claims to property, in the 
first stage, results in a reduction in all players’ allocations to conflict in the second stage. 
This strategic effect causes the marginal return from property rights protection to 
exceed that of conflict. Although players make no explicit agreement with one another, 
the contribution to the public good of secure property is credible. Thus such an 
agreement, were it to be reached, is dynamically consistent. Relative to the Nash 
equilibrium, less resources are diverted away from production in the sub-game perfect 
equilibrium. In order for voluntary contributions to the security of property to occur, 
however, the marginal product of insecure production must be sufficiently high to 
compensate for the lost production. Hence, the Demsetz hypothesis holds. The 
minimum marginal productivity parameter under which a social contract arises, 
however, is increasing in the number of players because of the free-riding problem 
inherent in the public good provision. 
An autocracy, all else equal, can create secure claims to property at a lower level of the 
marginal product of insecure production than can occur in the social contract 
equilibrium. This is because the autocrat, by the power of coercion behind his ability to 
raise taxes, can overcome the free-riding problem inherent in the social contract. Like 
Grossman (2002), we find that the autocrat provides perfectly secure property, in the 
sense that citizens allocate nothing to conflict. The autocrat, however, simply replaces 
conflict with taxation. Hence, all of the surplus above the Nash equilibrium is captured 
by the autocrat (cf., Wintrobe 1990; Olson 1993; Grossman 2002; Hurwicz 2008). In 
contrast, conflict remains under a social contract, whenever the number of players is 
greater than two, so that claims to property are not perfectly secure. This occurs 
because as the number of players rises, the strategic effect of contributing to protecting 
claims to property diminishes. Hence, secure claims to property can arise at a lower 
level of the marginal productivity of insecure production under autocracy than in the 
social contract. 
 
Several comparisons to the Demsetz hypothesis should be emphasized. First, secure 
claims to property are more likely to arise in smaller societies, ceteris paribus. In the 
Demsetz hypothesis, this is usually attributed to transactions costs rising as the size of 
the population rises. In our model, it occurs because there is a tension between the 
free-riding of public good provision and the strategic effect upon one’s rivals’ allocations 
to conflict; as the size of the population rises, the strategic effect diminishes while the 
free-riding effect increases. Second, unlike the Demsetz hypothesis, we offer an explicit 
mechanism whereby secure claims to property might arise. Committing part of their 
endowment to the public good, prior to allocating the balance between production and 
conflict, is credible because of the strategic effect. English King John in 1215 signed the 
Magna Carta granting rights to his nobility over their property because the nobility was 
roused enough to march en masse upon London to demand those rights. Such an act 
would not be successful if nearly all of the nobles in England had not simultaneously 
pre-committed to contributing to the public good of countering the King. Similarly, in the 
American west and in the California mining camps, secure claims to property arose only 
after the ranchers and miners formed organizations whose purpose was to devote 
resources to creating and enforcing the security of property. 
 
This paper also contributes to the literature on conflict. While the security of claims to 
property is endogenous in all models of conflict, no papers have examined the creation 
of secure claims to property explicitly as the equilibrium result to a private provision of 
public goods problem. Our model emphasizes the strategic effect of contributing to the 
public good of property rights protection. Strategic effects in contest games in which 
players move sequentially has been studied by Dixit (1987), Baik and Shogren (1992), 
Leninger (1993), Grossman and Kim (1995) and Kolmar (2008). Dixit simply considered 
games in which asymmetric players moved in different sequences. Baik and Shogren 
and Leninger extended this to games in which the sequencing of moves was 
endogenously determined. Grossman and Kim (1995) and Kolmar (2008) considered 
games in which agents first chose defensive investments and then chose offensive 
investments. They each find that relative to the simultaneous move games, agents 
strategically over invest in defense against predation in order to reduce the amount of 
equilibrium predation. Hafer (2006), like us, considers a model in which agents have 
access to two productive processes, one of which requires a resource that is subject to 
thievery. In her model, there is asymmetric information about the marginal productivity 
of the insecure production, and players learn the true value of the productivity 
parameter to its owner by observing the intensity with which he defends his property. In 
none of these models, however, is defense of property a public good. Finally, Grossman 
(2002) considers a model in which an autocrat provides secure claims to property. Like 
us, he finds that the autocrat eliminates conflict. Grossman, however, considers neither 
the organic alternative to an autocrat that we model, nor how welfare varies between 
the autocratic and social contract equilibria as the value of production varies. 
 
2 Model assumptions 
We now present a model of conflict in which enforcement of secure claims to property is 
a public good. Suppose there are N ≥ 2 identical players, indexed i = 1, . . . , N. Each 
player has an endowment of ω units of labor and one unit of land. First, labor may be 
used to consume from the land directly: ci units of the endowment consumed in this 
fashion yields ci units of payoff. We call ci “subsistence” consumption, as it corresponds 
to the minimum level of equilibrium payoff. Second, labor may be used to produce a 
consumable good, “corn”. An investment of ki units of labor into corn production 
produces Aki units of payoff, where A is the marginal product of labor used in corn 
production. We shall vary the parameter A, which measures how valuable corn 
production is relative to subsistence consumption, to examine the Demsetz hypothesis. 
 
What distinguishes corn production from subsistence consumption is that, unlike 
subsistence consumption, corn production can be expropriated by others. While both 
subsistence gatherings and corn production can be stored, in ancient times conquerers 
generally took only the surplus above the subsistence level, leaving the conquered on 
the land to be plucked again another year.2 Given subsistence consumption has a 
normalized marginal productivity of unity, if A ≤ 1, insecure claims to property for corn 
are not of economic importance. 
 
Let pii denote the proportion of i ’s own corn production i appropriates, and let pi j 
denote the proportion of j ’s corn production expropriated by i . Thus 1, 
or all i = 1, . . . , N. Then because corn production can be expropriated while 
subsistence consumption cannot, the following is implied: 
 
Assumption 1 Each player’s payoff is the sum of what he appropriates from his own corn 
production and what he expropriates from the corn production of the other players, plus his 
subsistence consumption: 
 
(1)    
 
This follows the guns-or-butter model of Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007). However, we 
depart slightly from Garfinkel and Skaperdas with the presence of subsistence 
consumption, which follows Murphy et al. (1993). An important implication of this 
specification is that for values of A < 1 no conflict occurs. Furthermore, when A is high 
enough to induce no subsistence consumption, the equilibrium allocations to production 
and conflict do not vary with A. 
 
A player may also allocate his endowment towards two goods that affect the security of 
property. The tool of conflict, xi , is the amount of labor utilized protecting one’s own 
property and expropriating the property of others.3 An increase in xi increases both the 
share of i ’s own corn production that i appropriates and the share of the others’ corn 
production that i expropriates. But conflict is not the only tool that affects the security of 
property. 
 
Finally, players may also privately provide the public good of enforcing secure claims to 
property, yi , which we call “security”, by supplying labor in the defense of their own and 
others’ corn production.4 An increase in the public good of security increases the share 
of player i ’s own corn that i appropriates and reduces the share of others’ corn that I 
expropriates. Thus while an increase in i ’s conflict increases both his appropriation and 
his expropriation, an increase in i ’s contribution to security has an asymmetric effect on 
appropriation and expropriation. Conflict makes the aggressor better off and others 
worse off (and so generates a negative externality); security is a public good that makes 
the provider both better off (by making their own production secure) and worse off (by 
making their thievery less effective). 
 
Indexing the public good of enforcing secure claims to property as G, a positive value of 
G ensures that the contest success function is asymmetric in the sense that one’s 
appropriation of one’s own output in a symmetric equilibrium in a society of size N is 
greater than 1N and that one’s expropriation of the other players output is less than 1/N: 
 
Assumption 2 The proportion of player i ’s corn production that player i appropriates be given 
by 
 
(2)    
 
where . Under this technology of conflict, the proportion of player j ’s corn 
production that player i expropriates is 
 
(3)    
 
It is natural to think of the security of claims to property in terms of pii . Only when pii = 1, 
are claims to property perfectly secure. Thus, claims to property are perfectly secure if, 
and only if, conflict is driven to zero: i.e., if x1 = x2 = · · · = xN = 0. 
 
In writing pii and pi j in this manner, we are making several assumptions relative to the 
literature. First, compared to Hirschleifer’s specification (with a “decisiveness 
parameter” set equal to one), where , we see that G increases the security of 
claims to one’s own property and decreases one’s claims to other’s property. Second, 
compared to the specification in Grossman and Kim (1995), which can be written as pii 
= φxi /(φxi + X−i ), where φ measures the effectiveness of defensive weapons versus 
offensive weapons and where , we see that an increase in G plays a 
similar role to an increase in φ. If, however, we were to use Grossman and Kim’s 
specification, writing φ = G, then the denominators of pii and pi j each differ, which 
causes the derivatives of pii and pi j with respect to G and xi to be too complicated for 
closed form solutions.6 The specification we use assumes the denominators of pii and 
pi j to be equal, which restricts the first-order-necessary-conditions to be tractable. The 
public good, G, of enforcing secure claims to property has three components. First, we 
assume that there exists a natural asymmetry that favors the owner over the 
expropriator. This is indexed by the parameterθ > 0, which could occur because of a 
barrier such as a mountain or a river that divides one’s property from others, or simply 
due to the same evolutionary pressures that require the fox fail more often than the 
hare. The effect of θ > 0 is that as X → 0, pii → 1 and pi j → 0. This natural advantage 
to protecting one’s own production, however, is limited: 
 
Assumption 3 ω(N − 1) > θ > 0. 
 
In addition, the public good of enhancing the security of claims to property may be 
provided either privately or by the state. Private security, Y = , is provided by a 
private contribution from from each individual. Public security, S, is paid for through a 
tax, t, imposed by the state. The total contribution to enforcing the security of claims to 
property is G = θ + Y + S. Thus, natural, private and state provided security are 
assumed to be perfect substitutes. 
 
From Assumption 2, the rates at which the appropriation and expropriation parameters 
change as xi and yi increase are given by 
 
(4)    
 
Thus the security of one’s claim to one’s own production in (2) is increasing in G, while 
one’s claim to other’s production in (3) is decreasing in G. In contrast, both (2) and (3) 
are increasing in xi . Note also that < 0 and < 0, so the marginal 
productivity of conflict is strictly decreasing. Similarly, < 0, while > 0, 
so the marginal productivity of security of property is strictly decreasing as well. 
 
Each player simultaneously maximizes his payoff by choosing how he allocates his 
after-tax labor endowment, ω − t, across the four possible choices: corn production, 
private provision of security, subsistence consumption, and conflict: 
 
(5)    
 
Thus ki is the residual from the choices of ci , xi , yi and tax on the labor endowment, t. 
 
As we have assumed that each player’s endowment is identical, we restrict our attention 
to symmetric equilibria. However, all of the results presented can be derived with few 
alterations if we were to allow the endowments to differ. 
 
3 The simultaneous choice Nash equilibrium 
Our objective in this section is to see how well claims to property are protected absent a 
state and to characterize the Nash equilibrium in terms of the productivity parameter, A, 
the number of competitors, N, and the security of property parameter, θ. Since no state 
exists, we set S = t = 0. 
 
In the Nash equilibrium, each player simultaneously chooses xi , ci , and yi to maximize 
ui , taking the other players’ actions as given. The first-order-necessary-conditions for 
player i include (5) and the following: 
 
(6)    
 
(7)    
 
(8)    
 
Each unit of the endowment allocated to any of subsistence consumption, conflict or 
security has an opportunity cost in foregone appropriated corn production of Apii . From 
(7), the marginal benefit from an increase in subsistence consumption is simply the 
direct increase in payoff from the subsistence consumption. Since (4) implies that ∂pii 
∂Y = ∂pii ∂xi, the only difference between (6) and (8) is in how expropriation is 
affected by an increase in security and in conflict. From (8), an increase in expenditures 
on conflict by I increases both i ’s appropriation and expropriation shares, while in (6) an 
increase in expenditures on security by i only increases i ’s appropriation, while it 
decreases i ’s expropriation. Hence, conflict dominates security as a strategy, no matter 
what others do. This results in the following: 
 
Proposition 1 In the Nash equilibrium to the conflict game, each individual contributes zero to 
the public good of secure claims to property protection. 
 
Proof In the symmetric Nash equilibrium, (4) implies . 
Therefore, (6) can be written as 
 
 
 
Thus in the symmetric Nash equilibrium, each player sets yi = 0. 
 
It is well known that free-riding effects cause private contributions to public goods to be 
less than the social optimum, since agents ignore the positive externality they impose 
upon others. Here, the free riding effect is magnified by the presence of the individually 
superior investment in conflict. Therefore, Proposition 1 implies that insecure property 
rights remain insecure in a game of conflict. Furthermore, as this result holds for all A > 
0, the Demsetz hypothesis does not hold in the simultaneous choice Nash equilibrium. 
There is also nothing in this result that depends upon the imposition of symmetry in the 
strategies of players. A similar result can be shown to hold when conflict is separated 
into defensive and offensive functions as well, since, unlike an allocation to security, an 
allocation to defense increases the amount one appropriates of one’s own production 
without affecting the amount one expropriates from others. Indeed, this result depends 
only upon the assumption that an increase in private conflict expenditure increases both 
the share expropriated and appropriated, while an increase in the public good of 
enforcement of security of property increases the appropriation share while decreasing 
the expropriation share. 
 
Given that yNE = 0, the symmetric Nash equilibrium conditions for the choice of conflict, 
x, and subsistence consumption, c, given by (8) and (7), respectively, can be written, 
using (5), as 
 
(7’)    
 
(8’)    
 
The next result shows that  < ω: 
 
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 3, in the symmetric Nash equilibrium, no player devotes his 
entire endowment to production. 
 
Proof Suppose not. Suppose that players devote their entire endowment to production, 
then = 0. However, = 0 implies that (8’) can be written as 
 
 
which is positive by Assumption 3. This contradicts xNE = 0. 
 
This result occurs because setting c = x = 0 results in positive net marginal payoff to xi 
by (8’), and, if A < 1, to ci by (7’). 
 
Given Propositions 1 and 2, there are three types of equilibria that may arise. Equilibria 
where > 0 and  = 0 are called the conflict Nash equilibrium (CNE), 
since conflict and production are both positive in this equilibrium. Equilibria where 
 = 0 and  = ω are called the subsistence Nash equilibrium (SNE), as 
there is neither conflict nor production in this equilibrium. Finally, equilibria in which 
> 0,  ≥ 0 and  > 0 are called the conflict-subsistence Nash equilibrium (CSNE), 
as there is simultaneously conflict, production and subsistence consumption in these 
equilibria. 
 
First, consider the conflict Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium, < 0, xNE > 0 and 
kNE > 0. Therefore, from (7 ), the marginal product of labor allocated to corn 
production must satisfy A ≥ .A ≡ Nω ω+θ . If this condition holds, then (8’), (5), and 
(1) imply that 
 
(9)    
 
By Assumption 3, the level of conflict in the CNE is positive for all N ≥ 2. Hence, 
property is less than perfectly secure in the CNE. Also, the minimum value of the 
marginal product of corn production such that the CNE occurs, .A, is increasing in N and 
ω, and decreasing in θ. 
 
Next, consider the subsistence Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium, xNE = kNE = 0, so 
that uNE = cNE = ω. Since xNE = 0 implies that pNE ii = 1, (7’) implies that cNE > 0 
only if A < 1. Therefore, 
 
(10)    
 
Security of property is irrelevant in the SNE since everyone devotes all of their 
endowment to subsistence consumption, which cannot be stolen. 
 
When θ > 0, there also exists an intermediate case in which 1 ≤ A < .A .9 The CSNE is 
characterized by cNE > 0, xNE ≥ 0 and kNE > 0. These are the simultaneous solutions 
to (8’), (7’) and (5): 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 The Nash equilibrium with N = 2 players (θ = 1 4ω) 
 
(11)   
 
Two properties of the CSNE are noteworthy. First, when θ = 0, xNE = kNE = yNE = 0 
and cNE = ω. Thus, θ > 0 is necessary for the CSNE to exist. Second, in the CSNE, 
uNE = ω, which is the same level of payoff obtained in the SNE. The marginal payoff of 
subsistence consumption is equal to unity. Since subsistence consumption coexists with 
production and conflict in the CSNE, the marginal product of conflict and production are 
also unity. 
 
Figure 1 shows how the equilibrium choices and equilibrium payoff vary for a range of 
values of A, when N = 2. The SNE occurs for A < 1. The CSNE begins at A = 1, where 
kNE jumps from zero to θ and cNE drops to ω − θ. As A increases in the CSNE, cNE 
decreases towards zero and kNE and xNE each increase. In the CNE, A ≥ .A, cNE = 0 
and kNE and xNE are each constant, hence the payoff is increasing in A. The lower 
boundary of the CNE, .A, is increasing in N and decreasing in θ. 
 
Diamond (1997) provides a stark example of how the marginal product of labor 
allocated to corn production determines the nature of the Nash equilibrium. Around 
1000ad, Polynesians settled both New Zealand and the Chatham Islands, some 500 
miles southeast of New Zealand. The rich environment of New Zealand contrasted 
sharply with the cold Chatham Islands climate which was unsuited to Polynesian 
agriculture.  
 
While the Maori grew to a rich but warlike society, the Moriori society reverted to an 
unstructured hunter-gatherer society. In 1835, upon learning of their existence, 900 
Maori sailed to the Chatham Islands where they encountered some 2000 Moriori, whom 
the Maori declared to be their slaves. The Moriori, who “had a tradition of resolving 
disputes peacefully,” decided to share their resources with the Maori, but before an offer 
could be made the Maori attacked. A Moriori survivor described the ensuing slaughter: 
“[The Maori] commenced to kill us like sheep…[We] were terrified, fled to the bush, 
concealed ourselves in holes underground and in any place to escape our enemies. It 
was of no avail; we were discovered and killed—men, women, and children 
indiscriminately” (id. at p. 53). Hence the Moriori, who had existed for over 800 years in 
a SNE, were ill suited for surviving in the CNE to which the Maori had become 
accustomed. 
 
4 Autocratically provided property rights 
Now we consider the case where one of the citizens becomes an autocrat who offers to 
create secure claims to property by providing state-sponsored security of size S to 
supplement the existing natural secure claims to property, θ, in exchange for the right 
to impose a tax of t on the labor endowment of each player. 
 
Bloch (1960) describes the method of taxation of a lord upon his subject during the 
Medieval period in Europe: 
 
The powerful individual who forced his weaker neighbor to submit to him was apt 
to require the surrender of his property as well as his person. The lesser men, 
therefore, in offering themselves to the chief, also offered their lands. The lord, 
once the bond of personal subordination had been sealed, restored to his new 
dependent the property thus temporarily surrendered, but subject now to his 
superior right, expressed by the various obligations imposed upon it. (Bloch, 
1960, at p. 171) 
 
The tax used by William the Conquerer and his successors was a tax on the labor and 
land endowments, not upon the output, per se. A tax on the endowment does not 
subject the autocrat to the moral hazard problem that occurs when output is taxed. 
 
The autocrat uses his power of taxation to expropriate wealth for his own consumption. 
This corresponds to the “tinpot” form of dictatorship in Wintrobe (1990). Since the 
autocrat keeps any surplus tax revenues above the costs of supplying the security for 
himself, he chooses the level of security to provide that maximizes the surplus he is 
able to grab from his citizens. Since even a benevolent autocrat provides a level of S 
just high enough that citizens allocate nothing to conflict (cf. Grossman 2002), thereby 
monopolizing the use of force, it is easy for a despotic autocrat to use this force for his 
own benefit.11 The problem of despotism, however, is more serious than an inequitable 
distribution of wealth: the net surplus created under an autocrat is invariant to A, since 
the autocrat faces a participation constraint that his citizens require at least as much 
payoff as they gain in the simultaneous choice Nash equilibrium.  
In the simultaneous choice Nash equilibrium, players take the tax t and the autocrat’s 
choice of S as given when choosing how to allocate their after-tax endowment between 
corn production, conflict, subsistence consumption and private provision of the public 
good of secure claims to property protection. Therefore, in the symmetric simultaneous 
choice Nash equilibrium, the first-order-necessary conditions for the choices of y, c, and 
x, respectively, satisfy 
 
(12)    
 
(13)    
 
(14)    
 
As in the case where no autocrat exists, the first-order condition (12) for yi is negative 
for all feasible values of y, x, and c. Hence: 
 
Proposition 3 In the symmetric Nash equilibrium under an autocrat, each player sets y∗ = 0. 
 
Therefore, when an autocrat exists, only the autocrat provides secure claims to 
property. Nevertheless, relative to the Nash equilibrium, there is no crowding out of 
private provision, as equilibrium contributions to the public good of property protection 
was already zero by Proposition 1. 
 
Recall that players can ensure payoff equal to ω by consuming some of the endowment 
directly as subsistence consumption. Since there is no need for secure claims to 
property in a subsistence economy, the autocrat cannot improve welfare. Thus the 
interesting outcomes occur when A is large enough that players do not wish to devote 
any of their labor endowment to subsistence consumption. Absent an autocrat, this 
occurs when A ≥ .A. From(13), (14), and (5), for any feasible values of S and t, when A 
≥ .A the Nash equilibrium level of investment in conflict and corn production and the 
corresponding symmetric equilibrium payoff satisfy the following: 
 
(15)    
 
Comparing (15) with (9), these are identical to the CNE values with ω replaced by the 
after-tax endowment, ω − t, and with G = θ replaced by G = θ + S. The surplus, RK , 
the autocrat earns is the difference between his tax revenues and his costs of providing 
state-sponsored security: 
(16)    
 
The autocrat sets the tax rate, t∗ K such that his citizens are indifferent between the 
simultaneous choice Nash equilibrium outcome—since that is the best that they can do 
in his absence—and the equilibrium outcome in which the autocrat taxes them at rate t 
and provides security equal to S.13 Thus, the surplus gain is entirely captured by the 
autocrat, which means that RK measures the welfare gain under an autocrat. There are 
two cases to consider, depending upon whether A ≥ .A or A < .A. 
 
When A ≥ .A, the equilibrium payoffs absent an autocrat are the payoffs in the CNE. 
From, (9), that payoff is uNE = A N (ω + θ). When each citizen takes S and t as given 
when choosing xi and ki , the payoff with an autocrat is given by (15). Thus the 
participation constraint faced by an autocrat is 
 
(17)    
 
Taking the tax rate as given and solving for the level of security that just makes each 
player indifferent between having an autocrat who provides security of claims to 
property of S and doing without an autocrat and experiencing the CNE payoff yields S∗ 
K (t) = t. Substituting this into the surplus function (16) yields R∗ K (t) = (N − 1)t. The 
surplus the autocrat earns is strictly increasing in t. From (15), the t∗ K that maximizes 
the autocrat’s surplus is the value of t∗ K such that x∗ (t∗ K ) = 0. An autocrat, therefore, 
provides the level of security just high enough to prevent any conflict between his 
citizens. Therefore, when A > .A, under an autocrat, the equilibrium satisfies 
 
(18)    
 
The values  are identical to the CNE allocations to private provision of 
security, subsistence consumption, and corn production, respectively, given in (9). 
Furthermore, the tax charged by the autocrat, t∗ K , is identical to the CNE allocation to 
conflict, xNE, and is independent of A. By Assumption 3, the autocrat improves welfare 
since , for all A ≥ .A and N ≥ 2. The autocrat is unable to induce his 
citizens to increase their investment in corn relative to the CNE, however, as he has 
extracted through his taxes exactly the same amount of labor his citizens invested in 
conflict in the CNE. Hence, the autocrat simply replaces conflict between individual 
citizens with exploitation by the autocrat. As t∗ K is independent of A, the surplus gain 
under the autocrat is independent of A. 
An increase in θ forces the autocrat to decrease the tax rate and provision of secure 
claims to property, which means that more is available for production and less is 
available for expropriation by the autocrat. Thus in a country with good natural 
protection, the autocrat will thereby prosper less than in a country in which the 
landscape makes it more difficult to protect one’s own property. 
 
When A < .A, the payoff each citizen earns in the CSNE absent an autocrat is uNE = ω. 
Solving for the size of state-sponsored security, S∗ K (t), that equates the left side of 
(17) to payoff in the CSNE yields 
 
 
 
Therefore, the autocrat’s surplus is 
 
 
 
Again, R∗ K is strictly increasing in t, which implies that t∗ K is chosen to set x∗ K = 0. 
Thus, an autocrat always drives conflict to zero.14 From (13), x∗ K = 0 implies that c∗ 
K = 0 for all A > 1. Therefore, the autocrat chooses 
 
(19)   
 
where AK is theminimum marginal product of labor allocated to corn production such 
that an autocrat may exist. Hence, 
 
(20)   
 
At A = AK , R∗ K = 0. Since AK is decreasing in θ, an increase in θ increases the 
range of values {A, N} such that an autocrat can improve welfare relative to the Nash 
equilibrium. Varying θ reveals that AK is bounded between 2N−1 N and 2N−1 N+1 , 
which never rises above A = 2. 
 
Comparing (11) with (20), the the labor allocated to corn production under the autocrat, 
k∗ K , is greater than the corresponding CSNE level.15 This is because there is no 
subsistence consumption with an autocrat. 
 
When AK ≤ A < .A, (20) implies k∗ K is independent of θ, since an increase in θ is 
exactly offset by a decrease in S∗ K by (19). Thus, an increase in θ is fully expropriated 
by the autocrat when AK ≤ A < .A, since the payoff in the Nash equilibrium is 
independent of θ. This is the opposite of what happens when A ≥ .A, where the Nash 
equilibrium payoff is increasing in θ. Hence, the participation constraint forces the 
autocrat to leave that surplus with his citizens. 
 
5 The sequential choice social contract equilibrium 
Now consider a sequential choice game, in which private provision to the public good of 
enforcing secure claims to property occurs in the first stage, and the remaining 
endowment is allocated between subsistence consumption, production and conflict in 
the second stage. Assume that there is no state, so that S = t = 0. 
 
We call this game a social contract, since players commit to the allocation of yi prior to 
making each of the other choices. While there is no explicit agreement made between 
the parties, the equilibrium allocations to security are derived using subgame perfection, 
so the implicit agreement is credible. As there is no need for secure claims to property if 
subsistence consumption is chosen in the second stage, we suppose that A ≥ ASC, 
where ASC is the minimum value of A such that c1 = c2 = · · · = cN = 0 in the second 
stage. In solving the second stage of the game, we let y1, y2, . . . , yN take arbitrary 
non-negative values. The allocation of labor between xi and ki then depends upon the 
values of y1, y2, . . . , yN from the first stage decisions. 
 
Taking y1, y2, . . . , yN as given, but holding c1 = c2 = · · · = cN = 0, from (8), the first-
order-necessary-conditions for the choice of x1, x2, . . . , xN satisfy 
 
(21)   
 
Solving the joint system of (21) for xi (Y, yi ) yields 
 
(22)   
 
Observe that  is decreasing in Y−i : 
 
(23)   
 
Furthermore, ui is decreasing in X−i : 
 
(24)  
 
since .  
Thus, the choice of yi satisfies 
 
(25)   
 
where is given by (6). In the social contract there is a strategic effect associated with 
property rights protection, given by the second expression in (25), which is positive 
since an increase in yi causes x j to decrease for all j , which increases the payoff to i . 
This suggests that, unlike in the simultaneous choice Nash equilibrium, it may be 
possible for some {A, N} values, that the sequential choice sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium contributions to the public good of enforcing the security of claims to 
property are positive. 
 
The following proposition characterizes the condition under which y^SC > 0, and how 
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium allocations to conflict, security of property, and 
production, as well as the resulting payoff and security of property, are related to the 
parameters. 
 
Proposition 4 For all A ≥ ASC ≡ N(N+1) / 2(Nω+θ) , the symmetric social contract sub-game 
perfect equilibrium (SCSPE) satisfies 
 
(26)  
    
 
for 1 ≤ A < ASC, the SCSPE is identical to the CSNE; and for A < 1 the SCSPE is 
identical to the SNE. 
 
Proof See the Appendix. 
 
When N = 2, Proposition 4 shows that conflict is completely eliminated, x SC = 0, so 
that secure claims to property are perfectly enforced, i.e., pSC ii = 1 when N = 2. 
Furthermore, the expenditure on private provision of security is less than the CNE 
expenditures on conflict: . Thus, the resources spent on 
security of property are less than the resources spent on conflict in the Nash 
equilibrium. This means more is left over for production in the SCSPE, i.e.,  > 
 = k^NE. Thus, the payoff is also higher in the SCSPE than in the CNE. These 
results are all due to the strategic effect investing in security has upon one’s rival. 
 
When N > 2, the SCSPE does not fully eliminate conflict, since x SC > 0 for N > 2. The 
effect any player can have upon influencing the behavior of the balance of the 
population diminishes as N grows. Indeed, the limit as N → ∞ is that kSC = ySC = uSC 
= 0 and x SC = ω, which is identical to the limit as N → ∞ to the CNE. This occurs 
because the aggregate provision to security, Y SC = N(ω−θ) N+1 , is increasing in N, 
but is bounded from above by Y SC ≤ ω − θ. In contrast, total conflict expenditure is 
increasing approximately linearly in N, so is unbounded as N →∞. Thus, the proportion 
of the dwindling corn production that one appropriates is diminishing towards zero as N 
increases. 
 
In order for the social contract to arise as an equilibrium arrangement, distinct from the 
simultaneous choice Nash equilibrium, the marginal product of labor allocated to corn 
must be sufficiently large, A > ASC = N(N+1)ω 2(Nω+θ) . This expression is 
increasing in N. Indeed, ASC is unbounded as N → ∞. Nevertheless, because ω > θ 
by Assumption 1, ASC is less than .A for all N. Hence the social contract is possible 
even for {A, N} values such that the payoff in the simultaneous choice Nash equilibrium 
is equal to the subsistence level. 
 
The surplus created under a social contract is the difference between the payoffs under 
the Nash equilibrium and the social contract: 
 
(27)   
 
When A ≥ .A, the welfare gain from a social contract is positive since ω > θ by 
Assumption 1. It is also positive for all values of ASC < A < .A. For A < .A, a player can 
always guarantee payoff equal to ω by reverting to subsistence consumption. Thus, 
uSC ≥ ω. However, ASC is the value of A such that uSC = ω. Thus, we have proved:  
 
Proposition 5 For all values of A > ASC, such that the sequential choice social contract sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium differs from the simultaneous choice Nash equilibrium, welfare is 
higher under the social contract than under the Nash equilibrium. 
 
This occurs because conflict is reduced and production is increased in the SCSPE 
relative to the CNE. 
 
An example of how the dissipation of rents is controlled in the sequential game is in how 
rent-dissipation was controlled on oil fields under the rule of capture. One of the 
consequences of the rule of capture in oil fields was that surface owners, recognizing 
the migratory nature of oil, typically drilled the first wells at the corners of their property. 
The common law, however, developed an ingenious response to this problem. 
Producers, as agents for the surface rights owner, were required to drill an offset well 
adjacent to any well drilled on adjoining properties. While this might at first glance 
appear to be doubly wasteful, it had the opposite effect. Since most wells were drilled 
on the boundaries of surface properties, the effect of the offset wells was that most of 
the oil recovered by a particular producer was from his own property. 
 
An example of how effective this was in preserving rents is given by the 71,000 acre 
Slaughter field discovered in west Texas in 1936, which had over a hundred surface 
rights owners. An attempt to coordinate production on the whole field failed, but 28 
cooperative sub-units were created. By 1975, 427 wells had been drilled along the 
boundaries of the sub-units at a total cost of 156 million dollars (Libecap andWiggins 
1985; Boyce and Nostbakken 2011) estimated the field generated over five billion 2007 
dollars in net-of-drilling-cost revenues for its owners between 1936 and 2008. Thus, the 
427 wells drilled on the subunit boundaries dissipated less than three percent of the 
rents. By prohibiting migration of oil across sub-unit boundaries, these wells provided a 
public good which prevented even worse dissipation of rents had the oil been allowed to 
migrate. While not conflict in the sense that property was destroyed through violence, 
the common property rent-dissipation had the same potential as violence to destroy 
wealth. But by investing in boundary wells, the field’s owners found a way to enhance 
the security of their claims to property. 
 
6 When does the social contract welfare dominate an autocrat? 
Now we can compare the equilibrium welfare under a social contract with that in which 
secure claims to property are provided by an autocrat. 
 
The minimum value of the marginal product of labor allocated to corn production such 
that an autocrat can arise is AK . This is increasing in N at a decreasing rate, and the 
limit as N → ∞ is AK = 2. Likewise, the minimum level of A under which a social 
contract can arise, ASC, is also increasing in N, but as N → ∞, ASC is unbounded. This 
suggests that when N is large, secure claims to property can arise under an autocrat at 
lower values of A than under the social contract. This is made exact by the following: 
 
Proposition 6 For N = 2, ASC = AK, but ASC > AK when N > 2. Proof We saw above that an 
autocrat is able to create property rights only if A ≥ AK = ω(2N−1) Nω+θ . For all N ≥ 2,  
 
 
Fig. 2 The conflict equilibrium boundaries 
 
 
 
When N = 2, the minimum value of the marginal product of labor allocated to corn 
production under which a social contract can exist is the same as when an autocrat can 
exist. However, for N > 2, the inequalities hold strictly.  
 
This result is shown in Fig. 2, which shows the boundaries between the three Nash 
equilibria cases as solid lines A = 1 and A = .A, and the lower bounds where the 
autocrat and a social contract can create property rights as the dashed lines AK and 
ASC. Both AK and ASC occur in the conflict-subsistence Nash equilibrium region, which 
implies that both can create property rights at {A, N} values below the .A locus, where it 
becomes profitable in the Nash equilibrium to forego subsistence consumption. The AK 
locus for N > 2 lies below the ASC locus. For large N, players under a social contract 
have difficulty creating secure claims to property because the freeriding problem 
overwhelms the strategic incentive. In contrast, an autocrat is able to coerce his citizens 
to pay taxes to support the provision of secure claims to property, so long as the 
participation constraint (17) is satisfied. Hence, the autocrat is able to create property 
rights at much lower levels of marginal productivity of insecure production than is 
possible with a the social contract. 
 
For all values of A between AK and ASC, the social contract is dominated by an autocrat 
because the autocrat is able to create surplus relative to the Nash equilibrium, while the 
social contract can do no better than the Nash equilibrium. However, for A ≥ ASC, the 
welfare gain under the social contract is linearly increasing in A [see 
(27)], while the welfare gain to an autocrat is independent of A [see (18)]. Therefore, 
we may state the following: 
 
Proposition 7 For A ≤ ASC, an autocrat creates greater welfare than the social contract, but for 
A sufficiently high, the social contract welfare dominates an autocrat. 
 
Proof When A = ASC, the welfare gain to the social contract relative to the Nash 
equilibrium is zero by (27). However, under an autocrat the welfare gain relative to the 
Nash equilibrium is 
 
 
 
This is positive for all N > 2 and equal to zero for N = 2. For A ≥ .A, the surplus gain 
relative to the Nash equilibrium from the social contract is linearly increasing in A by 
(27). In contrast, the surplus gain relative to the Nash equilibrium from the autocrat is 
given by (18), which is positive, but independent of A. Thus, for A sufficiently large, 
. 
 
Both the autocrat (explicitly) and the social contract (implicitly) face the constraint that 
payoff of the citizens must be at least as large as the Nash equilibrium payoff. Between 
AK and ASC, only an autocrat can create surplus relative to the simultaneous choice 
Nash equilibrium because of the free-riding problem. While an autocrat’s surplus is 
increasing in A when AK ≤ A < .A, for A ≥ .A the net surplus the autocrat creates, 
, is independent of A. Hence, this bounds the social gain under an 
autocrat relative to the Nash equilibrium. In contrast, under a social contract, the welfare 
gain relative to the Nash equilibrium is linearly increasing in A for all A ≥ ASC. Thus, for 
some A sufficiently larger than ASC, the social contract dominates the autocrat. 
 
To illustrate this, suppose that A ≥ .A. Then the surplus created under a social contract 
exceeds the surplus created under an autocrat if A ≥ A∗ ≥ .A, where 
 
(28)     
 
Thus a social contract is able to do better than an autocrat so long as the marginal 
product of labor allocated to corn production is sufficiently large. However, as A∗ is 
increasing at an increasing rate in N, increasing N while holding A constant implies that 
an autocrat does better than a social contract for large societies. This is because the 
autocrat is able to overcome the free-riding problem that overwhelms the social contract 
equilibrium as N grows large. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the regions in which each form of protection of claims to property 
may arise. Below the locus AK , neither a social contract nor an autocrat may 
 
 
Fig. 3 Welfare maximizing outcomes in A-N space 
 
arise. Thus, there is no social investment in secure claims to property. The Nash 
equilibrium (CNE) involves only subsistence consumption when A < 1, and entails 
investments in corn production and conflict, in addition to subsistence consumption, 
when 1 ≤ A < AK . In the region where AK ≤ A < ASC, a welfare gain is only possible 
through an autocrat, but no welfare gain through a social contract is possible. In the 
region ASC ≤ A < A∗, secure claims to property may be provided by either a social 
contract or an autocrat, but the welfare gain under an autocrat is higher. When A ≥ A∗, 
secure claims to property may still be provided by either a social contract or an autocrat, 
but the welfare gain under a social contract is larger. This result is consistent with the 
model of Acemoglu et al. (2000), which implies the rich extend the franchise to avoid a 
revolt by committing to future wealth transfers. As A increases in the region AK ≤ A ≤ A∗, 
inequality is on the rise as the autocratic reaps all the surplus gain. Once the inequality 
reaches A∗, a social contract arises (possibly through revolt) extending the franchise. 
 
Assuming that all autocrats become tin-pot dictators and that the welfare maximizing 
method of social organization is chosen, Fig. 3 summarizes the equilibrium types of 
outcomes that can be sustained as a function of the size of the population and the 
marginal product of labor allocated to corn production. Holding N constant and raising 
A, such that 1 ≤ A < AK , results in moving from a subsistence economy with no conflict, 
when A < 1, to a state in which conflict and production both occur but the payoff is 
unchanged. In the region AK ≤ A < A∗, an autocrat is able to offer a contract, which 
rational citizens are indifferent between accepting and not, that allows him to increase 
aggregate welfare, with the autocrat keeping the surplus he creates. 
 
In this region, there is no conflict. Above the A∗ locus, however, the gains from insecure 
production are sufficiently high that aggregate welfare is improved by adopting a social 
contract, even though for N > 2 conflict is again positive.20 Thus conflict is non-
monotonically changing as A increases. Below A = 1, there is no conflict, and then 
conflict increases in the region between 1 and AK . Then conflict is eliminated in the 
region of autocracy, but rises again once the social contract comes into effect. 
 
The fragility of the social contract in terms of N is also evident in Fig. 3. Suppose that A 
> ASC, so that a social contract maximizes welfare. Then holding A constant, an 
increase in N makes it possible that an autocrat can increase aggregate welfare relative 
to an existing social contract. This could occur because a benevolent autocrat 
successfully argues (correctly) that he can increase welfare relative to the social 
contract because he can eliminate conflict, but then either he or his successor 
recognizes that he can capture that surplus for himself. 
 
7 Conclusions 
This paper has examined whether the Demsetz hypothesis, that secure claims to 
property arise when the value of creating them rises, holds in an anarchy equilibrium. 
We considered a game in which players may allocate their endowment across 
subsistence consumption, investment in insecure productive activities, conflict over the 
insecure production, and contributing to the public good of property protection. We 
evaluated how equilibrium behavior changes as the marginal product of labor allocated 
to insecure production, relative to subsistence consumption, and the number of players 
are varied. 
 
Secure claims to property are not provided in a game in which players simultaneously 
choose to allocate their endowment among production, conflict, and the public good of 
secure claims to property, in the Nash equilibrium. This occurs because allocations to 
conflict raise both the proportion of a player’s own production that he appropriates and 
the proportion of others’ production that he expropriates. In contrast, contributions to 
secure claims to property only raise the proportion of his own production a player 
appropriates; it reduces the proportion of others’ production he expropriates. Thus 
players prefer to allocate labor to conflict rather than the public good of property 
protection. As the marginal product of insecure production rises, all else equal, society 
becomes richer because the proportion of the endowment allocated to conflict is 
bounded from above. Larger societies, however, are characterized by higher levels of 
conflict, and hence players receive lower payoffs. 
 
An autocrat who taxes the endowments of his citizens to provide secure claims to 
property, and who keeps all of the surplus above the Nash equilibrium level of payoff of 
his citizens, is able to provide secure claims to property, so long as the marginal product 
of labor allocated to insecure production is large enough to pay for the provision of 
secure claims to property. Indeed, such an autocrat creates perfectly secure claims to 
property, driving conflict to zero. When the value of the marginal product of labor 
allocated to insecure production is large, however, an autocrat merely replaces the 
Nash equilibrium level of conflict with expropriating taxes. As the level of conflict is 
bounded, so is the level of taxation. Thus the amount of surplus an autocrat can create 
relative to the Nash equilibrium is limited.  
 
In a social contract, players first simultaneously allocate part of their endowment to 
protection of claims to property, and then allocate the remainder between conflict and 
insecure production. When there are only two players, the resulting subgame-perfect 
Nash equilibrium creates perfectly secure claims to property at the same cost as an 
autocrat. As the number of players rises, however, the minimum marginal product of 
labor allocated to insecure production necessary for a social contract to arise is always 
higher than that under which an autocrat can create secure claims to property.  
Furthermore, security of claims to property created in this fashion are imperfect, as 
players under-invest in property rights protection relative to the social optimum in an 
attempt to free-ride on others. Nevertheless, the social contract welfare dominates an 
autocrat when the marginal product of insecure production is sufficiently high. The level 
of the marginal product of insecure production, such that the social contract welfare 
dominates an autocrat, is increasing in the size of the population. Thus a social contract 
is most likely to arise in small populations with high productivity of investment. 
 
The results of our model are consistent with historical examples. For example, the 
Magna Carta is the result of the English nobility replacing their despot with a social 
contract, presumably because it was welfare enhancing (as well as redistributive). 
However, as the mining camps of the California gold rush and the grazing associations 
of the American west demonstrate, the social contract is fragile. In both cases, a social 
contract evolved which provided secure claims to property. In both cases, however, the 
social contract involved a substantial amount of conflict and eventually collapsed. The 
deterioration of the social contract was a result of a substantial increase in the 
population, in the case of the mining camps, and a significant decline in the value of the 
livestock, in the case of the the grazing associations. 
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